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AN ADAPTIVE APPROACH FOR AN 
EVOLVING CRIME: THE CASE FOR AN 
INTERNATIONAL CYBER COURT AND 
PENAL CODE 
INTRODUCTION 
echnological innovation over the last half-century has bestowed 
revolutionary advantages upon humanity. Yet for all its brilliant 
progress, technology’s constant state of development has also cultivated 
an evolving criminal field capable of inflicting unprecedented damage: 
cybercrime. To date, legislative efforts to fight the numerous forms of 
cybercrime, from localized mischief-making to highly destructive acts of 
cyberterrorism, have been largely inefficient and regularly outpaced by 
dynamic criminal tactics1 and the mutations of cyberspace itself. As long 
as the global community continues to take insufficient action to address 
the threats posed by cybercriminals, the risk of a catastrophic cyberat-
tack—with the potential to eradicate vast quantities of private records, 
dismantle corporate activities, and suspend entire governments—will 
persistently increase.2 
Cybercriminals have been regarded as a serious threat to governments 
and state security since the dawn of the digital age, costing the global 
community billions of dollars each year.3 Today, cybercriminals are 
playing a more prominent role in geopolitical affairs than ever before as 
they increasingly direct their focus to nontraditional targets in new and 
novel ways. In late August 2011, for example, a group of hackers suc-
cessfully impersonated Google, the popular search engine and e-mail 
provider, and used their disguise to snoop on Internet users.4 In an unre-
lated case from the latter half of 2011, a ruthless Mexican crime syndi-
cate, Los Zetas, found itself in the crosshairs of Anonymous, a well-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 1. See, e.g., Christopher E. Lentz, Comment, A State’s Duty to Prevent and Respond 
to Cyberterrorist Acts, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 799, 799–801 (2010); Kelly A. Gable, Cyber-
Apocalypse Now: Securing The Internet Against Cyberterrorism and Using Universal 
Jurisdiction as a Deterrent, 43 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 57, 60–66 (2010). 
 2. See, e.g., Charlotte Decker, Note, Cyber Crime 2.0: An Argument to Update the 
United States Criminal Code to Reflect the Changing Nature of Cyber Crime, 81 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 959, 960–61 (2008). 
 3. Id. at 961–62; see generally Gable, supra note 1, at 59–66. 
 4. The targeted e-mail accounts belonged to people living in Iran. Neither the pur-
pose of the attack, nor its focus on Iranian e-mail accounts, is clear. Somini Sengupta, In 
Latest Breach, Hackers Impersonate Google to Snoop on Users in Iran, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 31, 2011, at B4. 
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known collective of hackers from across the globe.5 After Los Zetas ap-
parently kidnapped one of their hackers, Anonymous—which had ille-
gally accessed confidential NATO documents only months before6—
released a video on YouTube, the popular video sharing website, in 
which a masked figure criticized Los Zetas for its criminal behavior and 
pledged to release the identities of one hundred of Los Zetas’ major con-
tacts.7 The Anonymous member was released within days.8 
In addition to individuals and collectives perpetrating such novel cy-
berattacks, sovereign governments are engaging in potentially illegal on-
line behavior with greater regularity. In November 2011, the United 
States accused China and Russia of using proxy computers and dispersed 
Internet routers in other countries to spy on Americans over the Internet.9 
The United States itself has admitted to considering the use of cyberat-
tacks during its involvement in 2011’s Libyan revolution10 and may have 
utilized a computer worm to target uranium-enriching centrifuges in Ira-
nian nuclear facilities.11 Cybercriminals acting as government agents in 
such scenarios may be able to cause more widespread damage, and pre-
sent even more challenging legal and logistical hurdles for law enforce-
ment officials, than isolated actors. 
As hackers’ capabilities and resources continue to grow, and as more 
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 5. Damien Cave, After a Kidnapping, Hackers Take On a Ruthless Mexican Crime 
Syndicate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2011, at A6. 
 6. Hackers Gain Access to NATO Data, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2011, at A7. 
 7. Cave, supra note 5, at A6. 
 8. Paul Wagenseil, Anonymous wins victory in drug cartel fight, MSNBC.COM (Nov. 
4, 2011, 5:28 PM), 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/45169382/ns/technology_and_science-
security/t/anonymous-wins-victory-drug-cartel-fight/#.T2eVnXjs620. 
 9. Thom Shanker, In Blunt Report to Congress, U.S. Accuses China and Russia of 
Internet Spying, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2011, at A4; see also Richard A. Clarke, Op-Ed., 
How China Steals Our Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2012, at A27 (providing an overview 
of Congressional efforts to address cybercrime and noting that “Robet S. Mueller III, the 
director of the F.B.I., said cyberattacks would soon replace terrorism as the agency’s No. 
1 concern as foreign hackers, particularly from China, pentrate American firms’ comput-
ers and steal huge amounts of valuable data and intellectual property”). 
 10. Eric Schmitt & Thom Shanker, U.S. Debated Cyberwarfare in Attack Plan on 
Libya, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2011, at A1. 
 11. Michael Totty, The First Virus . . ., WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2011, at R2; Tom Gjel-
ten, Security Expert: U.S. ‘Leading Force’ Behind Stuxnet, NPR (Sept. 26, 2011), 
http://www.npr.org/2011/09/26/140789306/security-expert-u-s-leading-force-behind-
stuxnet. 
 12. See, e.g., Vivek Kundra, Op-Ed., Tight Budget? Look to the ‘Cloud’, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 31, 2011, at A27. 
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cyberattack’s damage becomes increasingly daunting. Though the United 
States to date has managed to weather most of the cybercrimes perpe-
trated against it with relatively modest damage, other less fortunate na-
tions provide ominous examples of what could be in store for the global 
community. In 2007, for one example, Estonia was effectively shut down 
for three weeks by a series of relatively simple cyberattacks that targeted 
government, media, and business websites.13 Estonia made itself particu-
larly vulnerable by being at the vanguard of adopting online processes—
the government opted to conduct most of its operations over the Internet 
while individual Estonians conducted much of their personal affairs, in-
cluding more than ninety-eight percent of their private banking, online.14 
Despite Estonia’s stark example of the risks associated with taking state 
business online, the number of nations adopting Internet-based opera-
tions continues to grow.15 
Owing perhaps to the ever-expanding list of potential targets, the fre-
quency of cybercrimes is increasing. The U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security announced that there were eighty-six reported attacks on critical 
infrastructure computer systems in the United States between October 
2011 and February 2012, an increase of seventy-five attacks from the 
same time-span the previous year.16 These attacks were just a small part 
of the more than 50,000 cyberattacks reported to the agency since Octo-
ber 2011.17 
Due to the uniquely global dimensions of cybercrime and the world’s 
growing reliance on technology, the international community needs to 
adopt an international penal code for cybercrime and vest jurisdiction 
over this unique body of law in an international criminal court or tribu-
nal. Such a code is necessary to provide a uniform set of definitions, 
norms, and standards, and to effectively regulate a crime—evolving fast-
er than many legislatures can operate—that knows no territorial bounda-
ries. 
This Note seeks to examine the justification for this new approach and 
to evaluate the inherent difficulties in regulating cybercrime through tra-
ditional criminal systems.18 Part I, in sections A and B, considers the de-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 13. Lentz, supra note 1, at 799–800; Gable, supra note 1, at 61. 
 14. Gable, supra note 1, at 61. 
 15. See, e.g., Kundra, supra note 12, at A27. 
 16. Michael S. Schmidt, New Interest in Hacking as Threat to Security, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 13, 2012, at A16. 
 17. Id. The article also notes that a total of 10,000 attacks were reported the previous 
year. Id. 
 18. This Note will not discuss the important role that self-governance plays in Inter-
net-based activities as it is focusing primarily on criminal activity intended to cause harm. 
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velopment of cybercrime and the current methods of combating it. Part 
I.C considers the historical use of universal jurisdiction and its applica-
bility to cybercrime. Part I.D presents a brief survey of the strengths, 
weaknesses, and purposes of the International Criminal Court (“ICC”), 
which provides the most promising model for an international cyber-
crime court. Part II evaluates three proposals for tackling cybercrime at 
an international level: extending universal jurisdiction to encompass cy-
berspace, using traditional treaty law to bind states to domestic incorpo-
ration of international cybercrime codes, and finally, the preferred ap-
proach of adopting an international penal code under the jurisdiction of 
an international court or tribunal. 
I: THE EVOLVING LANDSCAPE OF CYBERCRIME 
Over the past fifty years, technological advancements have radically 
changed both personal and professional business activities.19 Since its 
invention in the late 1940s, the computer has come to play such a domi-
nant role in human culture that it may now be hard to imagine a world 
without its existence.20 Springboarding off of the computer came the in-
vention of the Internet and other networks that linked computers and 
computer systems together from around the globe.21 Though capabilities 
to create worldwide computer networks like the Internet had been avail-
able since the 1960s, it was not until the end of the Cold War, when the 
United States government became less concerned about potential security 
vulnerabilities, that the Internet became widely available for public use.22 
Over the last fifteen to twenty years, the use and accessibility of the In-
ternet have proliferated and web access has become a common feature of 
mainframe computers,23 tablet computers, cell phones, and other portable 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
For a thorough discussion of property rights, self-regulation in cyberspace, and additional 
important issues relating to cyberlaw, see generally Nicolas Suzor, The Role of the Rule 
of Law in Virtual Communities, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1817 (2010). See also generally 
Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural Value of 
Applying Constitutional Norms to “Private” Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263 
(2000); Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Towards A Hybrid Regulatory Scheme for the Internet, 2001 
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 215. 
 19. See, e.g., Decker, supra note 2, at 961. 
 20. Gable, supra note 1, at 67. Gable’s article provides a helpful overview of the 
technological developments of both the computer and the Internet. See generally id. 
 21. Id. at 68. 
 22. Id. at 68–69. 
 23. One of the major factors in the proliferation of the Internet has been declining 
costs of both personal computers and connectivity. Decker, supra note 2, at 960. The 
increase in availability, coupled with the unparalleled rapidity of technological advance-
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electronics like music players.24 Today, mobile devices provide regular 
Internet access to as many users as stationary computers.25 
Recently, a practice known as “cloud computing” has developed in 
which information is stored and accessed entirely through the Internet 
and other computer networks.26 Businesses have shifted toward increas-
ing reliance on cloud computing for the efficiency it can add in storing 
records, interfacing with customers, and cutting information technology 
infrastructure costs by eschewing the need to purchase and maintain req-
uisite hardware.27 Many individuals use cloud computing every day sim-
ply by accessing their e-mail or social networking websites; Google’s 
popular e-mail system, “Gmail,” and Facebook, the popular social net-
working site, are two primary examples of cloud computing products 
targeted toward the masses.28 As with businesses, individuals often use 
cloud e-mail accounts because access is available on any computer and 
there is essentially no technological upkeep necessary—an individual 
does not have to download new software packages or upgrade computer 
hardware to keep e-mails up to date.29 The allure of cloud computing has 
led to a rapidly expanding use of the practice across many sectors, in-
cluding government.30 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ment, has led to Internet access for an estimated seventy-five percent of Americans. Id. at 
961. 
 24. Gable, supra note 1, at 68–69. 
 25. David J. Goldstone & Daniel B. Reagan, Social Networking, Mobile Devices, and 
the Cloud: The Newest Frontiers of Privacy Law, 55-SUM B. B.J. 17, 21 (2011). 
 26. Id. at 21. The exact definition of cloud computing is imprecise, though one clear 
component is that a user does not own any of the technology involved in operation. The 
National Institute of Standards & Technology defines it as a 
“model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared pool of 
configurable computing resources . . . that can be rapidly provisioned and re-
leased with minimal management effort or service provider interaction.” Essen-
tially, users store or share their information on the Internet and third-party pro-
viders maintain that information on remote servers owned or operated by the 
provider. 
Ilana R. Kattan, Note, Cloudy Privacy Protections: Why the Stored Communications Act 
Fails to Protect the Privacy of Communications Stored in the Cloud, 13 VAND. J. ENT. & 
TECH. L. 617, 620–21 (2011) (internal citation omitted). 
 27. Id. at 622. 
 28. Id. at 618; see also Goldstone & Reagan, supra note 25, at 17. 
 29. Goldstone & Reagan, supra note 25, at 17. 
 30. Id. at 18. In a New York Times op-ed, Vivek Kundra, the Chief Information Offi-
cer for President Obama’s administration from 2009–2011, promoted the administration’s 
push into cloud technology. He writes that, “shortly after the Obama administration took 
office, we instituted a ‘Cloud First’ policy, which advocates the adoption of cloud serv-
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These advancements have ushered in an era of unprecedented effi-
ciency and speed in both personal and business-related Internet activity, 
but they have also created a user dependency on service providers to 
maintain and protect personal data.31 As more personal information is 
conveyed over the Internet and stored in the cloud, everything from in-
formation on bank accounts to federal infrastructure, from personal e-
mail to private photos, is increasingly vulnerable to cyberattack.32 As a 
result, nearly every person could be victim to a cyberattack, whether they 
are individual Internet surfers, non-computer-using customers of Inter-
net-using companies, or even citizens of cloud-embracing national gov-
ernments.33 Accordingly, governments strive to keep pace with techno-
logical advancements and to protect individuals, businesses, and them-
selves from cybercrime. However, these efforts have not always been 
sufficient to stem the tide of cybercrime proliferation.34 
A. Definition of Cybercrime 
One of the primary obstacles in combating cybercrime is defining it. 
No internationally recognized legal definition exists, though there are 
functional definitions that focus on general offense categories.35 Cyber-
crime is, therefore, most accurately defined as crimes that are perpetrated 
over the Internet and that generally fall into two categories: first, those 
that target computers and information stored on computers, and second, 
those that use a computer to facilitate another crime.36 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ices by government agencies and mandates the transition of at least three projects for 
every agency to the cloud by next summer [2012].” Kundra, supra note 12, at A27. 
 31. Kattan, supra note 26, at 623. 
 32. See, e.g., Gable, supra note 1, at 68. 
 33. Id. at 59–63. 
 34. See id. at 74–77. See generally Haley Plourde-Cole, Note, Back to Katz: Reason-
able Expectations of Privacy in the Facebook Age, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 571 (2010); 
Miriam F. Miquelon-Weismann, The Convention on Cybercrime: A Harmonized Imple-
mentation of International Penal Law: What Prospects for Procedural Due Process?, 23 
J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 329 (2005). 
 35. Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 34, at 330–31 (drawing the functional defintions 
from a 1990 document produced by the UN Centre for International Crime Prevention, 
now integrated into the UN Office on Drugs and Crime); Eighth United Nations Congress 
on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Havana, Cuba, Aug. 27–
Sept. 7, 1990, International Review of Criminal Policy—United Nations Manual on the 
Prevention and Control of Computer Related Crime ¶¶ 20–26, available at 
http://www.uncjin.org/8th.pdf. 
 36. Decker, supra note 2, at 964; Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1017 (2001). 
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When a cybercriminal targets a computer, (or, increasingly, someone’s 
mobile device37) the computer may be victimized in ways analogous to 
many other traditional crimes,38 not unlike a person who is assaulted 
while walking down a street or a house that is vandalized. Alternatively, 
the computer may be subjected to crimes that are unique to computers of 
the Internet era.39 There are many crimes that fall into the latter category, 
though the average computer user may not be aware of the distinctions 
among all of them. 
Most of these crimes utilize specific programs to damage software.40 
Viruses, perhaps the most well-known examples of malicious software 
(sometimes called “malware”41), are programs that modify other com-
puter programs and can spread from one computer to another whenever a 
file is transmitted between them, be it via the Internet, traditional disk, or 
other means.42 While viruses generally require human direction before 
travelling from one host computer to another, some can self-replicate and 
transfer themselves.43 These self-replicating programs are called 
“worms.”44 
Today, viruses and worms often infect a computer through the user’s e-
mail. Unsolicited bulk e-mails from commercial parties, usually with no 
preexisting relationship to the recipient, are known as “spam” and are 
often the vehicle cybercriminals use to distribute their malicious soft-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 37. See, for example, Nick Bilton, Android Is No. 1 Target of Mobile Hackers, 
N.Y.TIMES (Aug. 25, 2011, 9:39 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/android-
number-one-target-by-mobile-hackers-report-says/?ref=anonymousinternetgroup, dis-
cussing hackers’ preference for targeting phones that use Google’s Android platform 
because of Google’s lax screening procedures for new mobile applications. 
 38. Eric J. Sinrod & William P. Reilly, Cyber-Crimes: A Practical Approach to the 
Application of Federal Computer Crime Laws, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH 
TECH. L.J. 177, 187–88 (2000). 
 39. Dominic Carucci, David Overhuls & Nicholas Soares, Computer Crimes, 48 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 375, 378 (2011). The article further differentiates between a computer 
being the object of a crime and the subject of a crime. Generally, a computer is an object 
of a crime when its hardware or its software is stolen. A computer is generally the subject 
of a crime in when it is targeted in other ways, including those listed above the line here. 
Id. 
 40. See id. 
 41. Id. at 379. 
 42. Id. Carucci, Overhuls, and Soares provide an extensive description of the varying 
kinds of malicious software that is highly informative and provides the foundation for 
much of the information located herein. 
 43. Sinrod & Reilly, supra note 38, at 221. 
 44. Carucci, Overhuls & Soares, supra note 39, at 379–80; Katyal, supra note 36, at 
1024–25. 
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ware.45 This can be similar to a “Trojan horse,” a program that has a le-
gitimate function but also contains hidden malicious coding.46 Where 
spam is a specific e-mail crime, though, a Trojan horse can come from 
any type of file or program, such as word processors or music files.47 
Some malicious software programs, known as “logic bombs,” may be 
designed to activate malicious programs upon the occurrence of a spe-
cific event or on a specific date, while remaining dormant in the mean-
time.48 
Entire computer networks can be specifically targeted by additional 
kinds of malicious programs. “Sniffers” are programs that monitor and 
analyze network data and can be used to acquire confidential information 
including passwords, credit card numbers, and more.49 “Web Bots” or 
“spiders” are similar, although they go the extra step of creating search-
able indexes of the data passing through the network, often overwhelm-
ing that targeted network with requests for information.50 Whether 
through the use of spiders or merely as a mischievous end in itself, many 
cybercriminals target websites or networks with “denial of service at-
tacks,” which debilitate sites by sending overwhelming numbers of sim-
ple requests for connectivity.51 
It is important to note that each of the malicious software programs 
listed above has the potential to be used constructively.52 For example, a 
virus could be designed to repair glitchy software while a sniffer could 
be used as a network security program.53 However, cybercriminals are 
particularly adept at utilizing these programs to wreak havoc.54 One im-
portant factor in the success of these cybercrimes is the cybercriminal’s 
ability to use someone else’s computer as an agent from which the cy-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 45. Carucci, Overhuls & Soares, supra note 39, at 379. 
 46. Katyal, supra note 36, at 1026. 
 47. Carucci, Overhuls & Soares, supra note 39, at 380. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 380–81; Katyal, supra note 36, at 1026–27. 
 52. See, e.g., Geoffrey A. North, Carnivore in Cyberspace: Extending the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act’s Framework to Carnivore Surveillance, 28 RUTGERS 
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 155, 162–63 (2002) (describing the FBI’s use of a sniffer pro-
gram called Carnivore to monitor a suspect’s e-mail and Internet activity). Use of these 
devices by law enforcement has led to numerous debates regarding legal limits on Inter-
net users’ reasonable expectations of privacy, both in the U.S. and internationally. See 
Plourde-Cole, supra note 34; Kattan, supra note 26, passim. 
 53. See, e.g., Carucci, Overhuls & Soares, supra note 39, at 380. 
 54. See, e.g., Lentz, supra note 1, at 800. 
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bercriminal may then perpetrate more crimes with greater anonymity.55 
For example, one hacker could use a sniffer to track the e-mail addresses 
of thousands of employees in a particular company and then send each 
employee spam containing a self-replicating worm program designed to 
corrupt the user’s computer in a number of different ways. Alternatively, 
a hacker could track each of the employees’ e-mail account passwords, 
transcribing them into a spider-created database. Using these passwords, 
the hacker would then be able to deliver a denial of service attack to the 
company’s network by overloading the system with requests to log into 
each e-mail account simultaneously. Such tactics can make policing the 
Internet and other networks exceptionally challenging.56 
The second major category of cybercrime uses a computer to facilitate 
a separate, more traditional crime.57 Cybercriminals often utilize one or 
more of the corrupting programs discussed above to glean information 
from potential victims or to disable security programs in furtherance of 
committing underlying, non-computer-related crimes.58 Generally, there 
are four types of underlying crimes: identity theft or extortion, theft of 
intellectual property, fraud, and the possession or distribution of child 
pornography.59 While these four crimes typically have straightforward 
statutory definitions, there are a number of areas, particularly those fo-
cusing on national security, where it remains unclear whether the use of a 
computer has led to, or alone constituted, a crime.60 The confusion stems 
in equal part from the frequently evolving technological landscape and 
from the lack of uniformity in cybercrime statutes between international 
bodies.61 
B. Legislation and Enforcement 
Cybercrime poses unique challenges to law enforcement officials due 
to three major factors: first, the lack of territorial jurisdictional bounda-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 55. Carucci, Overhuls & Soares, supra note 39, at 381. 
 56. Id. at 377. Katyal relates a specific denial of service attack, perpetrated by a fif-
teen-year-old Canadian citizen in 2000, which underscores the daunting and complex 
nature of these crimes. The hacker shut down some of the most popular websites, includ-
ing Amazon.com, CNN.com, Yahoo!, and others, by utilizing remote computers to or-
chestrate the attack, as well as three “dummy” websites, making it very difficult for law 
enforcement to trace the attack. The FBI only learned of the hacker’s identity after he 
began bragging about the success of his cybercrime in Internet chartrooms. Katyal, supra 
note 36, at 1027. For further discussion, see infra Part I.B of this Note. 
 57. Carucci, Overhuls & Soares, supra note 39, at 378. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. at 381; Decker, supra note 2, at 967–96. 
 60. See, e.g., Decker, supra note 2, at 962. 
 61. See, e.g., Gable, supra note 1, at 98, 100–04. 
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ries in cyberspace; second, the lack of uniform cybercrime statutes 
around the world; and third, the rapid and ongoing evolution of cyber-
crime.62 Cybercriminals will continue to outpace law enforcement efforts 
if states do not tackle each of these interrelating factors.63 
1. General Challenges 
One of the most unique features about cybercrime is that it operates in 
a nonphysical realm that is free from territorial boundaries.64 As men-
tioned in Part I.A, cybercriminals have the capability of targeting com-
puters or networks anywhere in the world and may use third party com-
puters or networks, located in wholly different locations from either 
themselves or their targets, as instruments.65 Any country that is trying to 
prosecute a cybercriminal will find itself forced to contend with the fact 
that even a local hacker may have used, perhaps even inadvertently, In-
ternet connections in other countries to perpetrate a local cybercrime. 
Additionally, the cybercriminal may reside in a country with conflicting, 
or nonexistent, cybercrime statutes.66 
A notable example of this kind of enforcement challenge occurred in 
early 2000, when hackers used stolen credit card information to extort 
money from several American banks.67 Upon investigation, the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) identified the suspected hackers as two 
Russian nationals living in Russia.68 However, the United States did not 
have a mutual legal assistance treaty (“MLAT”) with Russia that would 
have allowed for the countries to extradite the suspects to the United 
States.69 The FBI eventually tricked the hackers into coming to the 
United States under false pretenses, monitored their computer activity 
during their time in America, and then used the information gleaned from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 62. See Susan W. Brenner & Joseph J. Schwerha, IV, Transnational Evidence Gath-
ering and Local Prosecution of International Cybercrime, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER 
& INFO. L. 347, 369–75 (2002); Decker, supra note 2; Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 
34; Amalie M. Weber, The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime, 18 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 425, 446 (2003). 
 63. Gable, supra note 1, at 98. 
 64. Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 34, at 334; Carucci, Overhuls & Soares, supra 
note 39, at 417. 
 65. Carucci, Overhuls & Soares, supra note 39, at 417. 
 66. Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 34, at 335; Carucci, Overhuls & Soares, supra 
note 39, at 417. 
 67. Weber, supra note 62, at 427–28. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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watching the suspects’ online movements to arrest them.70 Any efforts to 
limit these kinds of transnational law enforcement obstacles will neces-
sarily rely heavily on the existence of shared statutory definitions of cy-
bercrime terminology and the existence of domestic laws in each partici-
pating country that will allow for international cooperation.71 
Establishing such cooperative relationships can be a herculean task as 
the definitions for cybercriminal statutes vary from state to state in both 
substance and semantics.72 This challenge has two components. First, 
translators struggle to accurately maintain the same meaning of a statu-
tory definition or phrase in each state’s official language.73 Second, the 
connotative definition of a crime may vary significantly from one culture 
to the next.74 
A recent event in Iran provided an illuminating example of the ever-
present variances in legal doctrine. Iranian security forces arrested, and 
in some instances physically beat up, seventeen young men and women 
who participated in a squirt-gun fight that had been organized on Face-
book.75 In a statement that might seem absurd to Western sensibilities, 
one of Iran’s lawmakers stated that Iranian security forces had to “stop 
the spreading of these morally corrupt actions,” referring to simple 
squirt-gun fights.76 Though Internet-based activities played a secondary 
role to the “criminal” acts of these Facebook users, this episode reveals 
the challenges in identifying uniform definitions for cybercrimes. A gov-
ernment that is deeply conservative, ideologically extreme, or facing 
popular unrest may be more likely to consider a cybercrime that which is 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 70. Id. Weber explains that the two cybercriminals attacked American banks and 
credit card businesses repeatedly, broke into secured files, and extracted credit card and 
merchant identification numbers. They used this information to demand that their victims 
pay for “security ‘consulting services,’” which resulted in large damages for the victims. 
The FBI, after having its request for assistance snubbed by Russian authorities, used a 
ruse in which it made the Russian hackers false job offers. While the hackers were in the 
United States for their “interviews,” the FBI used its own software to monitor the hack-
ers’ communications with their computer servers in Russia to learn their passwords and 
online identification information, and then accessed the hackers’ own files to acquire 
sufficient proof to make an arrest. Id. 
 71. See, e.g., Jennifer J. Rho, Comment, Blackbeards of the Twenty-First Century: 
Holding Cybercriminals Liable under the Alien Tort Statute, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 695, 710 
(2007). 
 72. Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 34, at 353. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Lama Abu-Odeh, A Radical Rejection of Universal Jurisdiction, 116 YALE L.J. 
(Pocket Part) 393, 394 (2007). 
 75. Farnaz Fassihi, Iran’s Wet Blankets Put a Damper on Water-Park Fun, WALL ST. 
J., Aug. 31, 2011, at A1. 
 76. Id. 
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innocuous in many other countries, such as using social media to orga-
nize rallies or protests.77 Such a discrepancy can, in turn, affect interna-
tional cooperation. A state may refuse to extradite, investigate, or pro-
vide any other kind of assistance to another nation if the two disagree 
over what modes of online conduct are criminal.78 
In some instances, states will be incapable of effective international 
cooperation because statutory and treaty law often lags far behind what is 
needed to effectively combat cybercrime.79 States may lack the re-
sources, technology, or procedures to effectively regulate cyberspace.80 
Even in technologically advanced countries like the United States, which 
have taken a more active stance on legislating against cybercrime, differ-
ences of opinion about how best to legislate are abundant.81 For example, 
juveniles or first time cybercriminals—committing only minor acts of 
mischief—may find themselves prosecuted under highly punitive statutes 
that were intended to deter large scale cybercrimes.82 A more ubiquitous 
challenge lies in the time-consuming nature of legislative processes, 
which hamstring states’ ability to prosecute cybercrime whenever a new 
technology spawns a new form of crime.83 Treaties and MLATs are sub-
ject to similar obstructions, perhaps to an even greater degree.84 
These three major impediments—jurisdictional disputes, lack of uni-
form definitions, and the gradual pace of legislation and treaty forma-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 77. See Abu-Odeh, supra note 74, at 394; see also H. Brian Holland, The Failure of 
the Rule of Law in Cyberspace?: Reorienting the Normative Debates on Borders and 
Territorial Sovereignty, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1, 32 (2005). Indeed, 
several countries have issued bans on social media and specific technologies, particularly 
in times of political turmoil. Syria, for example, banned certain Facebook features fol-
lowing the Tunisian revolution that launched the “Arab Spring” in 2011. Khaled Yacoub 
Oweis, Syria tightens Internet ban after Tunis unrest—users, REUTERS (Jan. 26, 2011, 
11:40 PM), http://in.reuters.com/article/2011/01/26/idINIndia-54427520110126. Simi-
larly, the Democratic Republic of the Congo banned text-messaging after a disputed elec-
tion led to voter outrage and calls for organized protest. Thomas Hubert, DR Congo elec-
tion: Deaf anger at ban on texting, BBC NEWS (Dec. 14, 2011, 2:14 PM), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16187051. Even more recently, an Egyptian 
court made it a crime for Egyptians to view Internet pornography. Amro Hassan, Court 
bans Internet pornography in Egypt, L.A. TIMES: WORLD NOW BLOG (Mar. 29, 2012, 
7:09 AM), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2012/03/court-bans-internet-porn-
in-egypt.html. 
 78. Brenner & Schwerha, supra note 62, at 357–58. 
 79. Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 34, at 335. 
 80. Weber, supra note 62, at 427–28. 
 81. Decker, supra note 2, at 976–77. 
 82. Carucci, Overhuls & Soares, supra note 39, at 378–79. 
 83. See Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 34, at 335. 
 84. Weber, supra note 62, at 443. 
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tion—can stymie states’ effective cybercrime prevention either individu-
ally or in conjunction with each other. To date, cybercrime prevention 
efforts have failed to sufficiently tackle all three factors simultaneously, 
resulting in a patchwork of cybercrime statutes that leaves gaps for cy-
bercriminals to utilize as “safe data havens.”85 Nevertheless, states have 
made significant efforts to create anti-cybercrime laws. 
2. Preventative Efforts in the United States 
In the United States, the first federal laws criminalizing unauthorized 
access to computers were passed in 1984.86 The original set of laws com-
prised several provisions within the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, a 
general crime statute.87 Over the next two and a half decades, the com-
puter crime provisions were expanded and recodified five times, most 
recently in 2008, resulting in what is now known as the Computer Fraud 
and Abuse Act (“CFAA”).88 The CFAA protects computers used in inter-
state or foreign commerce or communications by prohibiting seven acts 
of computer-related crime.89 Because the law has sought to keep up with 
the quick clip of cybercrime’s development, each of the five major ex-
pansions of the CFAA has significantly broadened the scope and juris-
diction of the statute.90 Though several Circuit Courts have narrowed the 
application of the law, and despite a required threshold of $5,000 in 
damage,91 some legal scholars argue that the CFAA has become danger-
ously broad in that it potentially grants the United States government 
jurisdiction over every Internet-connected computer in the world.92 Oth-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 85. Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 34, at 336. 
 86. Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 
MINN. L. REV. 1561, 1561 (2010). Kerr’s article provides a detailed and comprehensive 
legislative history of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, carefully examining each of the 
major amendments to the bill over the last quarter century. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Fraud and Related Activity in Connection with Computers, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 
(2006) (effective Sept. 26, 2008); see Kerr, supra note 86, at 1561–71; see also Carucci, 
Overhuls & Soares, supra note 39, at 392–96. 
 89. Carucci, Overhuls & Soares, supra note 39, at 392–94. The seven specific acts 
that CFAA prohibits, which are discussed in more detail in Carucci, Overhuls, and 
Soares’s articles are generally 1) accessing and/or transmitting computer files without 
authorization; 2) obtaining private information without authorization; 3) intentionally 
accessing a government computer without authorization; 4) accessing a protected com-
puter with intent to defraud; 5) knowingly, recklessly or negligently damaging a pro-
tected computer through hacking; 6) knowingly trafficking in passwords with intent to 
defraud; and 7) transmitting a threat to cause damage or to extort something of value. Id. 
 90. Kerr, supra note 86, at 1561. 
 91. Carucci, Overhuls & Soares, supra note 39, at 395. 
 92. See generally Kerr, supra note 86, at 1561. 
1152 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 37:3 
ers, however, warn that CFAA is still not broad enough to sufficiently 
combat cybercrime because of its inapplicability to as-yet-undeveloped 
forms of cybercrime and because of its minimum monetary require-
ment.93 These contrasting views reveal one of the major tensions in legis-
lating against cybercrime, namely the balancing of individual users’ pri-
vacy rights with the public’s interest in maintaining cybersecurity.94 
The United States has complemented the CFAA with a slate of addi-
tional statutes designed to target more specific cybercrimes.95 Among 
these are the Control the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and 
Marketing Act of 2003 (“CAN-SPAM”), which focuses primarily on 
curtailing spam; the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) 
and Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), which protect, among other 
private data, e-mail accounts, voicemail accounts, and television signals; 
and various copyright, fraud, child pornography, identity theft, and even 
cyber-bullying statutes.96 This body of law, taken together, seeks to ad-
dress four basic needs created by cybercrime: “protection of privacy, 
prosecution of economic crimes, protection of intellectual property and 
procedural provisions to aid in the prosecution of computer crimes.”97 
Other countries have tried to employ differing approaches to combat-
ing cybercrime, but with little success.98 Germany and France initially 
tried to hold Internet Service Providers (“ISPs”) liable for the content 
they were transmitting, while Cuba has simply limited Internet access to 
200,000 citizens.99 Yet most industrialized countries are now adopting 
statutes, similar to the CFAA, that target unauthorized access to comput-
ers and private information by focusing on the four needs identified in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 93. See, e.g., Decker, supra note 2, at 1010. 
 94. See generally Kattan, supra note 26, passim; Goldstone & Reagan, supra note 25, 
passim; Plourde-Cole, supra note 34, passim. 
 95. Carucci, Overhuls & Soares, supra note 39, at 396–410. 
 96. Id.; see also Control the Assault of Non-Solicited Pornography and Marketing 
Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-187, 117 Stat 2699 (2003) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7701–
7713 and 18 U.S.C. § 1937 (2006)); Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, 
Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–
2521, 2701–2710, 3121–3126 (2006)). 
 97. Carucci, Overhuls & Soares, supra note 39, at 418. 
 98. Id. at 417–18. 
 99. Id. However, Cuba has been unsuccessful in completely restricting Internet ac-
cess. This is primarily because those who have been permitted access, typically doctors 
or academics, often sell their access information on the black market. Cuba and the inter-
net: Wired, at last, ECON. (Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.economist.com/node/18285798. 
However, the Cuban government may be embracing a different approach to limiting In-
ternet access, given that Venezuela recently spent seventy million dollars to connect a 
1,000-mile fiber-optic cable between itself and the island in March 2011. Id. 
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the U.S. statutes listed above.100 One of the ongoing challenges facing all 
countries, though, is the procedural and logistical challenges that stem 
from pursuing cybercriminals who operate in a world free from jurisdic-
tional boundaries.101 
3. Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime 
The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime (“the Conven-
tion”) marks the most ambitious international effort to combat cyber-
crime to date.102 The Convention was drafted in 2001 in an effort to ad-
dress those specific jurisdictional challenges that came about with the 
evolution of the Internet and to facilitate greater cooperation between 
nations fighting cybercrime.103 It entered into force in January 2004 and, 
as of April 2012, the Convention had been ratified by thirty-three coun-
tries, including the United States.104 
Each signatory to the Convention agrees to three obligations: first, to 
criminalize certain computer-related conduct by statute; second, to estab-
lish investigative and electronic-evidence gathering procedures; and 
third, to assist in broad, international efforts to prosecute cybercriminals, 
including cooperation with fugitive extradition efforts.105 In addition to 
laying out suggested norms and standards for domestic cybercrime laws 
and MLATs between party states, the Convention provides uniform defi-
nitions of at least four terms indelibly linked to cybercrime: “computer 
system,” “computer data,” “service provider,” and “traffic data.”106 
In this way, the Convention has made important progress in addressing 
many of the challenges that plague cybercrime prevention.107 The four 
definitions listed at the outset of the Convention mark some progress in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 100. Id. at 418. 
 101. Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 34, at 335; Weber, supra note 62, at 425. 
 102. See, e.g., Gable, supra note 1, at 93. 
 103. Weber, supra note 62, at 425–26. 
 104. Convention on Cybercrime, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=185&CM=8&DF=
01/11/2011&CL=ENG (last updated Jan. 1, 2011) [hereinafter Cybercrime, COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE]. 
 105. Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 34, at 329–30. 
 106. Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. No. 185 
[hereinafter Convention on Cybercrime]. These definitions, listed at the beginning of the 
convention, were drafted as a direct result of the United Nation’s identification of “uni-
formity in law and consensus over definitional terms as two of the impediments that had 
to be overcome in order to achieve meaningful cooperation and successful enforcement.” 
Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 34, at 338. 
 107. See generally Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 34; Weber, supra note 62, at 445–
46. 
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unifying terms across languages.108 Similarly, the document calls for par-
ties to the Convention to criminalize four categories of crime and lists 
nine specific actions that should be criminalized.109 Both of these provi-
sions streamline cooperation and enforcement processes, as do the addi-
tional provisions that call for signatories to establish a minimum set of 
standardized legal procedures and to coordinate with each other by 
means of MLATs and other agreements.110 
Perhaps the most important feature of the Convention, and the reason 
for its growing list of participants,111 is that it allows participating states 
to retain a sense of total sovereignty.112 All of the obligations placed on 
signatories require only the creation of domestic law, not subjugation to 
extraterritorial legislation,113 and while MLATs come with ratification of 
the Convention, they do not supersede preexisting treaties.114 Further-
more, parties to the convention have the right to make reservations that 
limit their adherence to certain provisions or MLATs.115 National gov-
ernments find the Convention’s deference to their own sovereignty reas-
suring and may be drawn toward it, and future treaties on cybercrime, 
because of this.116 
However, the Convention still falls far short of addressing all of the 
challenges of fighting international cybercrime. At a fundamental level, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 108. Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 34, at 338. 
 109. Weber, supra note 62, at 431. The first category of crimes focuses on protecting 
privacy rights and specifically proscribes illegal access, illegal interception, data interfer-
ence, system interference, and misuse of devices. The second category outlaws fraud and 
forgery. The third category centers on content-related crimes, namely child pornography-
related offenses. The fourth category deals with copyright protections, as well as supple-
mental provisions relating to all of the aforementioned activities, such as corporate liabil-
ity standards and laws that forbid the aiding and abetting of cybercrime. Id. 
 110. Weber, supra note 62, at 433–34. 
 111. As of December 1, 2011, the following countries had ratified the Convention: 
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Moldova, Montenegro, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States. Cybercrime, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, su-
pra note 104. 
 112. Weber, supra note 62, at 442. 
 113. Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 106. 
 114. Weber, supra note 62, at 441–42. 
 115. Id. at 443. 
 116. Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 34, at 354; see also David J. Scheffer, Staying 
the Course with the International Criminal Court, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 47, 59–60 
(2002) (describing how the incorporation of the complementarity principle played a ma-
jor role in convincing the Clinton administration to sign the Rome Statute by addressing 
fears of forfeited sovereignty). 
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the Convention’s deference to national sovereignty prevents the treaty 
from adequately addressing one of the three major challenges of fighting 
cybercrime listed earlier: obstructive jurisdictional boundaries.117 Be-
cause not every state in the world is a party to the Convention, and be-
cause signatories can water down their own commitment through the use 
of reservations, safe data havens for cybercriminals will continue to exist 
throughout the world.118 Furthermore, the treaty’s reliance on local legis-
lation undermines the Convention’s progress in harmonizing terminology 
and criminal statutes—a party to the Convention may simply not meet its 
obligation to criminalize each of the listed actions, thereby reducing the 
efficacy of the treaty.119 The reasons for not enacting a particular law 
may vary, but the fact remains that the Convention offers no enforceable 
standards to which participating parties must conform.120 
The Convention has two other significant weaknesses. First, it fails to 
provide uniform procedural rules regarding privacy and other due proc-
ess rights for cybercrime suspects.121 Even with mutual assistance be-
tween two Convention signatories, where both have met all of the obliga-
tions laid out by the treaty, there may still be a conflict when one of those 
two states has more invasive cyber search and seizure statutes than the 
other.122 The potential—indeed likelihood—of such discrepancies does 
much to subvert the sense of cooperation the Convention is designed to 
foster, as participating countries will balk at full participation in the 
treaty if they are not guaranteed what they consider fair treatment for 
their citizens by other states.123 Second, the Convention, like all treaties, 
is more difficult to amend than domestic legislation and therefore is still 
subject to another one of the major obstacles of cybercrime prevention—
obsolescence in the face of a rapidly changing environment.124 
For these reasons, the Convention marks the best effort to date to com-
bat cybercrime yet still falls short of establishing the necessary legal 
tools and authority to overcome the three major obstacles of traditional 
territorial jurisdiction, disharmonious definitions of cybercrime terms, 
and rapid technological advancement.125 Due to the ever-growing threat 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 117. Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 34, at 359; Weber, supra note 62, at 443. 
 118. Weber, supra note 62, at 443–44. 
 119. Id. at 442–43. 
 120. Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 34, at 353–54. 
 121. Id. at 340–41. 
 122. Id.; see also Brenner & Schwerha, supra note 62, at 350. 
 123. Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 34, at 360. 
 124. Weber, supra note 62, at 443. 
 125. Id. at 445–46. See generally Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 34. 
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that cybercrime poses to international security, though, law enforcement 
agencies are bridging many of the legal gaps at an operational level.126 
4. The Growing Role of Multinational Task Forces 
Whether working through informal, mutually beneficial relationships 
or through formal mechanisms like Interpol and MLATs, law enforce-
ment agencies are finding methods to work together in order to prosecute 
cybercriminals to a greater, though still limited, extent than the Conven-
tion allows.127 At a hearing before the United States House Financial 
Services Committee’s Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Con-
sumer Credit in September 2011, an assistant director of the FBI’s Cyber 
Division testified that strategic discussions between the United States 
and major allies have “resulted in increased operational coordination on 
intrusion activity and cyber threat investigations.”128 He added that the 
United States “currently [has] FBI agents embedded full-time in five for-
eign police agencies to assist with cyber investigations,” and that the FBI 
has “trained foreign enforcement officers from more than [forty] nations 
in cyber investigative techniques over the past two years.”129 Similarly, 
the U.S. Secret Service operates twenty-three offices abroad130 and de-
ploys 1,400 agents trained in its Electronic Crimes Special Agent Pro-
gram throughout the world.131 When testifying to the United States Sen-
ate Committee on the Judiciary, a Deputy Special Agent in Charge of the 
Secret Service’s Criminal Investigative Division endorsed such multina-
tional field work and said that “the personal relationships that have been 
established in those countries [where the Secret Service operates offices] 
are often the crucial element to the successful investigation and prosecu-
tion of suspects abroad.”132 In addition to multinational task forces, law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 126. Decker, supra note 2, at 1005. See also Brenner & Schwerha, supra note 62, at 
394, which, written just before the initial development of multinational task forces, calls 
for just such an integration of law enforcement efforts as an important tool in fighting 
cybercrime. 
 127. See generally Brenner & Schwerha, supra note 62; Carucci, Overhuls & Soares, 
supra note 39, at 419. 
 128. Cyber Security: Threats to the Financial Sector: Hearing Before H. Fin. Serv. 
Comm. Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit, 112th Cong. 8 (2011) (statement of 
Gordon M. Snow, Assistant Director, Cyber Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Cybercrime: Updating the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Protect Cyberspace 
and Combat Emerging Threats: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th 
Cong. 4 (2011) (statement of Pablo A. Martinez, Deputy Special Agent in Charge, Crim-
inal Division, U.S. Secret Service). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
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enforcement agencies are increasingly turning to private and nonprofit 
corporations, particularly those that have international copyright en-
forcement programs, for assistance in combating cybercrime.133 
These collaborative efforts exemplify the most promising methods to 
prevent and prosecute cybercrime. The increased flexibility, rapid re-
sponse capabilities, and diverse populations within multinational task 
forces make them better equipped to overcome the three major obstacles 
of international cybercrime than treaties or any other regulatory mecha-
nism. Yet their efforts are still restricted by the red tape of jurisdictional 
limits and mercurial relations between states. 
C. Universal Jurisdiction 
One innovative approach toward combating cybercrime calls for grant-
ing every nation the right to prosecute cybercriminals under a universal 
jurisdiction theory.134 Such an approach offers immediate benefits as a 
powerful deterrent and as a means to reduce many of the restrictions that 
stem from traditional territorial jurisdiction.135 It is helpful, then, to 
briefly explore the historical usage of this rare legal principle. 
Universal jurisdiction grants any state the right to prescribe, adjudicate, 
and enforce a law against a person regardless of that person’s nationality, 
the nationality of any victim, or the location at which the crime was 
committed.136 Incumbent upon extending jurisdiction to such an expan-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 133. Id. Carucci, Overhuls, and Soares provide only one example of a private organiza-
tion working with law enforcement agencies, a software industry trade group called the 
Business Software Alliance, but they refer to multiple unnamed groups, as well. Carucci, 
Overhuls & Soares, supra note 39, at 419. 
 134. See, e.g., Gable, supra note 1, at 104–17. 
 135. See generally id.; Rho, supra note 71, at 709–10. 
 136. M. Cherif Bassiouni, Universal Jurisdiction for International Crimes: Historical 
Perspectives and Contemporary Practice, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 81, 89 (2001). Kenneth C. 
Randall offers a more detailed definition of universal jurisdiction by describing jurisdic-
tion in this way: 
[it] refers to a state’s legitimate assertion of authority to affect legal interests. 
Jurisdiction may describe a state’s authority to make its law applicable to cer-
tain actors, events, or things (legislative jurisdiction [sometimes called “pre-
scriptive jurisdiction”]); a state’s authority to subject certain actors or things to 
the processes of its judicial or administrative tribunals (adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion); or a state’s authority to compel certain actors to comply with its laws and 
to redress noncompliance (enforcement jurisdiction). A state may not legally 
assert legislative, adjudicatory, or enforcement jurisdiction over all persons and 
things within the state’s power and control. 
Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 
785, 786 (1988). 
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sive degree is the belief that allowing a state the authority to prescribe 
and adjudicate a certain crime, or set of crimes, on behalf of the interna-
tional community is instrumental in preserving world order.137 
For the most part, universal jurisdiction stems from customary law and 
not from treaties between nations.138 Because customary law is, gener-
ally, a set of rules and norms that affects every state—and creates a sense 
of legal obligation on all states to conform to that set of rules—universal 
jurisdiction, when applied to a specific crime, governs the entire commu-
nity of nations regardless of any country’s express willingness to be 
bound by it.139 
One of the major obstructions to the expansive use of this legal tool is 
that states must voluntarily relinquish some sovereign power.140 Because 
states are hesitant to give up any jurisdictional power, the global com-
munity must unquestionably consider a crime worthy of universal juris-
diction before such broad prosecutorial authority will be enforced. Since 
the middle of the twentieth century, the “heinousness principle” has been 
the standard used to justify universal jurisdiction over crimes that are 
“profoundly despised throughout the world.”141 
Unsurprisingly, universal jurisdiction is rarely applied.142 The first, and 
to date most prominent example of universal jurisdiction was the global 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 137. Bassiouni, supra note 136, at 88. 
 138. Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: 
Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
121, 132 (2007). 
 139. Id. at 130–32. Colangelo provides a more detailed definition of customary inter-
national law and describes it as being made up of 
two components: (i) a general state practice, and (ii) a belief or intent to act 
with legal purpose, or what is often called opinio juris. Customary law is uni-
versal in its application and is therefore theoretically binding on all states . . . . 
By contrast, [treaty law] results from formal agreements among states and 
binds only those states parties to the treaty. 
Id. at 131. 
 140. Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction’s Hol-
low Foundation, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 183, 184–85 (2004); see also Christopher Harding, 
The International and European Control of Crime, in RENEGOTIATING WESTPHALIA 183, 
190 (Christopher Harding & C.L. Lim eds., 1999) (noting that the rise in international 
criminal prevention efforts in Europe toward the end of the twentieth century is “to some 
extent associated with the weakening of the state structure”); see also Christopher Hard-
ing & C.L. Lim, The Significance of Westphalia: An Archaeology of the International 
Legal Order, in RENEGOTIATING WESTPHALIA, supra, at 1, 8 (questioning why states 
would “contrary to their own immediate self-interest, [accept] a limitation of their own 
sovereignty” by recognizing international human rights). 
 141. Kontorovich, supra note 140, at 205; see also Gable, supra note 1, at 108. 
 142. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 136, at 82. 
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prosecution of piracy143 that began in earnest in the seventeenth cen-
tury.144 Any nation was allowed to try and execute pirates caught on the 
high seas regardless of the nationality of the vessel the pirates chose to 
attack or the original nationality of the pirates.145 Though piracy was 
governed by universal jurisdiction before the advent of the heinousness 
principle, any state that prosecuted pirates was nevertheless considered to 
be preserving world order on behalf of the international community.146 
The crime of piracy easily lent itself to universal jurisdiction for two 
interrelated reasons. First, the high seas were extraterritorial spaces that 
most nations valued as a “global commons” essential for commerce.147 
As a general rule, each state’s jurisdiction on the high seas was limited to 
its own citizens and its own vessels.148 Thus, in order to adequately pro-
tect the communal safety of the high seas, an exception was made to the 
usual jurisdictional rules and states were allowed uniquely broad author-
ity when prosecuting pirates.149 Second, pirates voluntarily eschewed 
their own nationalities and disregarded the laws of all nations, thus mak-
ing pirates, in the truest sense, outlaws.150 As the influential, eighteenth 
century British jurist William Blackstone wrote, a pirate “‘declare[ed] 
war against all mankind’ and thus ‘all mankind must declare war against 
him.’”151 
For centuries, piracy stood alone as the only crime that was governed 
by universal jurisdiction. Slowly, slave trading became the second.152 It 	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was during the aftermath of World War II, though, that the heinousness 
principle came into effect and that universal jurisdiction was extended 
over a slate of new crimes, including genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity.153 There exist additional crimes, like the hijacking of 
planes, which have been universally condemned but have not yet reached 
an accepted status under customary law to be governed by universal ju-
risdiction.154 
Proponents of expanding the usage of universal jurisdiction emphasize 
its power to prevent crimes through its immense scope and applicability 
to potential criminals all over the world.155 In almost every instance 
where a theorist seeks to justify extending universal jurisdiction over a 
new crime, the basis for the extension is the crime’s similarity to pi-
racy.156 Currently, the crime (or class of crimes) that appears to enjoy the 
most popular justification for universal jurisdiction, and which is most 
successfully analogized to piracy, is terrorism,157 though even it stands a 
slim chance of facing true universal prosecution. 
Any expansion of universal jurisdiction is met with persuasive oppo-
nents. Critics rightly challenge a number of factors, aside from the sacri-
fice of state sovereignty,158 which will be discussed in some detail in Part 
II.A of this Note. However, one standout criticism regarding universal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 153. Kontorovich, supra note 140, at 194, 204–05; see also Randall, supra note 136, at 
800. 
 154. Bassiouni, supra note 136, at 115–34. 
 155. Gable, supra note 1, at 108. 
 156. Kontorovich, supra note 140, at 204–06. 
 157. Colengelo writes, 
Like pirates, terrorists, and in particular al Qaeda and those like al Qaeda, also 
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guishing between military and civilian targets . . . and their acts potentially tar-
get all states . . . . [B]y “throwing off his national character” in committing his 
illegal acts of war, the terrorist has, like the pirate, exposed himself to the en-
forcement jurisdiction of all states. He too wages a lawless war under the color 
of no state’s authority. 
Colangelo, supra note 138, at 145 (internal citations and punctuation omitted). Many 
theorists suggest that universal jurisdiction should be applied to a wider array of legal 
fields, such as drug-related crimes. See, e.g., Anne H. Geraghty, Universal Jurisdiction 
and Drug Trafficking: A Tool for Fighting One of the World’s Most Pervasive Problems, 
16 FLA. J. INT’L L. 371 (2004). Other scholars have pushed for universal regulation to 
cover specific, more controversial issues like in vitro fertilization and embryonic regula-
tion. See, e.g., Sherylynn Fiandaca, Comment, In Vitro Fertilizations and Embryos: The 
Need for International Guidelines, 8 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 337, 395 (1998). 
 158. See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 140; Abu-Odeh, supra note 74. 
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jurisdiction over cybercrime, discussed above, is the unresolved set of 
limitations that stem from a lack of a unified set of cybercrime defini-
tions.159 Universal jurisdiction proponents point out that even piracy 
lacks specific international definitions.160 Theorists on both side of the 
debate of universal jurisdiction note, under different lines of argument, 
the troubling fact that if the same acts that generally satisfy the elements 
of piracy are committed under the auspices of a sovereign state, they are 
considered acts of privateering, an act neither subject to universal juris-
diction nor universally condemned.161 
Still, because cybercrime is a uniquely global problem, the debate over 
whether it should be globally prosecuted via universal jurisdiction be-
comes a fundamentally important question. As this Note will explore 
more fully in Part II.A, expanding universal jurisdiction to some degree 
over cybercrime will be an important element of any effective preventa-
tive legislation. 
D. The ICC 
One relatively recent development in international criminal law has 
been the establishment of the ICC.162 Though this institution is still in its 
infancy, its creation has been a landmark development in international 
criminal law.163 Given the global nature of cybercrime, there can be little 
doubt that international judicial bodies of some form will play at least a 
limited role in the prevention and prosecution of cybercrime.164 Any 
practical solution to the growing threat of cybercrime should therefore 
include a role for a judicial body similar in design to the ICC. 
Representatives from a majority of the world’s countries, gathered at 
the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries in 1998, 
outlined the structure and powers of the ICC in what is now known as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 159. See, e.g., Abu-Odeh, supra note 74, at 394. 
 160. See Gable, supra note 1, at 108; see also Kontorovich, supra note 140, at 191. 
 161. Kontorovich, supra note 140, at 218–22; Colangelo, supra note 138, at 145. 
 162. See generally Remigius Oraeki Chibueze, The International Criminal Court: 
Bottlenecks to Individual Criminal Liability in the Rome Statute, 12 ANN. SURV. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 185 (2006); James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the 
Prevention of Atrocities: Predicting the Court’s Impact, 54 VILL. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 163. See, for example, Chibueze, supra note 162, at 187, stating that the creation of the 
ICC “was one of the remarkable achievements of the twentieth century.” 
 164. See, e.g., Miquelon-Weismann, supra note 34, at 360–61 (advocating for the pas-
sage of a proposed “Treaty to Establish a Constitution for Europe,” which would improve 
upon the Convention on Cybercrime by providing “for the right to an effective remedy 
and to a fair trial, presumption of innocence and right of defense, principles of legality 
and proportionality of criminal offenses and penalties, and the prohibition against double 
jeopardy”). 
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Rome Statute.165 The Rome Statute calls for a court that would have ju-
risdiction over “the most serious crimes of concern to the international 
community”166—including genocide, war crimes, and crimes against 
humanity—and that would be situated in The Hague, the Netherlands.167 
The treaty entered into force and established the ICC in 2002, with 121 
countries participating as of July 1, 2012.168 
The idea of an international criminal court was not entirely a novel one 
when the Rome Statute was drafted.169 Beginning with the Nuremburg 
Trials after World War II, which criminally prosecuted high-ranking Na-
zi officials for atrocities, the international community has moved steadily 
in the direction of holding individuals liable for violations of internation-
al laws (where before only state-actors might have been held liable for 
acts of genocide or war crimes).170 The trend continued throughout the 
twentieth century, resulting in the creation of specific international crim-
inal tribunals, modeled to an extent on the Nuremburg Trials, for 
atrocities committed in association with the conflicts in Yugoslavia and 
Rwanda.171 These tribunals were generally ad hoc, rendering jurisdiction 
over only a specific country or over a specific series of events.172 Es-
tablishing a permanent court with potential jurisdiction over all countries 
was, in many ways, a natural next step.173 
Because the potentially universal reach of the ICC was a concern for 
many of the parties involved in drafting the Rome Statute, they reached a 
series of compromises that limited the ICC’s jurisdiction in at least three 
significant ways.174 First, the ICC may only exercise its jurisdiction in a 
particular matter if one or more of the parties has consented, either 
through ratification of the Rome Statute or by being a citizen (over the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 165. Chibueze, supra note 162, at 185; Alexander, supra note 162, at 2–3. 
 166. Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 167. Alexander, supra note 162, at 2. 
 168. ICC at a Glance, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ICC+at+a+glance/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2012). 
 169. See Johan D. ven der Vyver, Personal and Territorial Jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1, 4–9 (2000). 
 170. Id. at 4–9. 
 171. These tribunals were officially titled the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
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age of eighteen) of a state over which the ICC held previously-vested 
authority by treaty.175 Second, and perhaps most importantly, the ICC 
must adhere to a policy of complementarity, meaning that it must remain 
a court of last resort that only reviews an issue if no preexisting domestic 
legal organism can, or will, hear it.176 Last, the United Nations Security 
Council retains the power to request that the ICC defer any investigation 
or prosecution for one year, a request that may be renewed for additional 
year-long intervals.177 
The ICC has the potential to be an extremely effective criminal deter-
rent and prosecutorial mechanism.178 However, proponents of the ICC 
worry that its power is diluted though treaty compromises to a point of 
being nearly moot.179 The restrictions, listed above, on its ability to hold 
jurisdiction over various claims and issues put damaging limits on the 
court’s purposes, they argue.180 The notion of complementarity, in par-
ticular, may allow states to protect their own nationals from ICC prose-
cution by retaining domestic jurisdiction,181 and the Security Council’s 
effective blocking power allows states that are not party to the Rome 
Statute, including the United States, to prevent the court from reaching 
certain individuals.182 These jurisdictional handcuffs reveal the major 
weakness of the ICC: its reliance on states for enforcement and valid-
ity.183 The ICC lacks police or military forces, let alone its own source of 
funding, and so it cannot apprehend suspects or enforce its own orders.184 
It is therefore subject to the political whims of a state when requesting 
that state arrest or surrender a defendant.185 The ICC may also be unable 
to functionally assist a weak state that seeks assistance in corralling crim-
inals within its borders.186 	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Ultimately, the success or failure of the ICC has yet to be seen.187 Too 
little time has passed for any substantive analyses to be made about the 
court’s effectiveness—to date only fifteen cases have been brought to the 
court188 and the court reached its first verdict in March 2012.189 For the 
ICC to have a long-term effect, the international community needs to 
demonstrate a stronger consensus in support of the court’s legitimacy and 
the barriers to its operation need to be removed.190 
II: THREE APPROACHES TO TACKLING CYBERCRIME ON AN 
INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
The application and prosecution of criminal law in the international 
arena always presents practical challenges.191 The issues of national sov-
ereignty, multinational cooperation, and a lack of enforcement mecha-
nisms, discussed in Part I of this Note, are just the beginning of the list of 
issues that plague any international efforts to regulate crime. Though cy-
bercrime is uniquely suited to international regulation, many of these 
same historical obstacles continue to exist.192 
An analysis of three distinct approaches to international regulation of 
cybercrime can highlight the way the international community’s percep-
tion of international regulation—particularly with regard to international 
courts—should evolve. The first approach calls for universal jurisdiction 
over cybercrime. The second approach relies on states’ domestic ratifica-
tion of cybercrime statutes that are drafted by international bodies. The 
third approach is the most radical, and yet the most pragmatic, calling for 	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an international penal code for cybercrime regulated by an international 
court and enforced by multinational task forces. As may often be the case 
with a technology-based issue, traditional legal tactics, including the first 
two approaches to cybercrime discussed here, are quickly becoming an-
tiquated and fail to meet challenges posed by a dynamic, expansive, and 
rapidly mutating species of crime.193 
A. Universal Jurisdiction for Cybercrime 
Extending universal jurisdiction over cyberspace and cybercrime can 
be very attractive at first glance, though careful examination reveals that 
it fails to address many of the problems presented by cybercrime and, if 
applied, may create new areas of concern.194 
In her article “Cyber-Apocalypse Now: Securing The Internet Against 
Cyberterrorism and Using Universal Jurisdiction as a Deterrent,” Kelly 
A. Gable forcefully lays out the value of universal jurisdiction over cy-
bercrime, with particular focus on the major crimes that may be labeled 
terrorist acts.195 The pivotal value of universal jurisdiction, as she argues, 
is in its impact as a deterrent.196 Physical prevention being nearly impos-
sible for multiple logistical and practical reasons,197 deterrence becomes 
the most viable solution to the challenge of would-be cybercriminals.198 
Universal jurisdiction alone, she argues, can provide the level of deter-
rence necessary because its broad reach can surmount many of the prac-
tical challenges of locating, and then prosecuting, cybercriminals by po-
tentially stripping cybercriminals of any data safe-havens.199 
Yet the very broadness of universal jurisdiction makes it a controver-
sial approach to any crime.200 Though, as mentioned in Part I.B of this 
Note, its application has expanded significantly since the end of World 	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War II,201 the international community has identified compelling reasons 
to be cautious in allowing its proliferation.202 Specifically, two sets of 
hurdles arise when considering the application of universal jurisdiction to 
cybercrime: first, proponents must justify the use of such unusually ex-
pansive prosecutorial power to the international community, and second, 
they must address the many practical implications in actually pursuing 
cybercriminals without regard for territorial boundaries.203 
At the outset, proponents of applying universal jurisdiction to cyber-
crime must first persuade the international community that the crimes 
have reached a level of heinousness on par with other crimes granted 
such an unusual international distinction, such as genocide or crimes 
against humanity.204 “Heinous” crimes, as discussed, are generally de-
fined in vague terms, such as those crimes that are “shocking to the con-
science.”205 Gable successfully argues that the very extreme acts of cy-
berterrorism—those that are of such a scale that entire financial or na-
tional security systems may be dismantled—may meet this standard.206 
However, any crime that falls short of this conscience-shocking standard 
may present difficult questions over whether the crime in question truly 
warrants being subject to universal jurisdiction.207 This dilemma also 
brings up the corollary practical concerns regarding the need for uniform 
terminology and definitions discussed earlier.208 
Most proponents of universal jurisdiction for cybercrime draw the 
common analogies to piracy as a method of justification,209 suggesting 
that the Internet is like the high seas—a valuable “global commons” es-
sential for commerce. For many of the reasons discussed in Part I.C, 
however, the historic crime of piracy on the high seas may fail to provide 
an accurate analogy for cybercrime. States were more comfortable with 
universal jurisdiction for piracy because pirates were readily identifiable 
as nonstate actors and because their impact was limited to one ship at a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 201. See Fry, supra note 146, at 176. 
 202. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 136, at 82. 
 203. See, e.g., Abu-Odeh, supra note 74, at 394. Abu-Odeh, a universal jurisdiction 
skeptic, suggests that universally prosecuted laws are likely to be promulgated by coun-
tries that are either economically or militarily powerful. She questions the impact of such 
laws, which she suggests would be pro-Israel, and their correlating procedures on Pales-
tinians. Id. 
 204. See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 140, at 205–06. 
 205. Id. at 206. 
 206. Gable, supra note 1, at 118. 
 207. See, e.g., Kontorovich, supra note 140, at 206–07. 
 208. See supra Parts I.B & I.C. 
 209. See, e.g., Gable, supra note 1, at 116; Kontorovich, supra note 140, at 184. 
2012] CASE FOR AN INT'L CYBER COURT & PENAL CODE 1167 
time.210 Pirates, put simply, did not present the kind of identification and 
capture challenges posed by today’s frequently anonymous cybercrimi-
nals, nor were they capable of dismantling entire countries through their 
plundering.211 Unlike a physical capture on the high seas, law enforce-
ment agencies may have to contend with cybercriminals hiding out in a 
host country while their criminal presence is manifested only on the 
“high seas” of the Internet.212 Furthermore, the piracy analogy again rais-
es the question of uniform definitions, as highlighted by the example of 
privateering.213 Because neither the heinousness standard nor the piracy 
analogy provide decisive justification for universal jurisdiction, it is 
unlikely that the international community will be easily convinced that 
cybercrime meets historical standards for expanding this broad prosecu-
torial power. 
Assuming that universal jurisdiction could be justified, though, the 
questions of terminology and definition become pivotal.214 Genocide, for 
example, may be able to pass muster as a crime worthy of universal ju-
risdiction because it is universally understood and definable in every lan-
guage without substantial controversy.215 Yet cybercrime, or cyberter-
rorism, can present challenges by being more controversial in definition. 
The term “terrorism,” alone, may not be easily defined as it lacks mean-
ing in any uniform legal sense.216 The adage of “one man’s terrorist is 
another man’s freedom fighter” highlights the subjectivity of the defini-
tion of terrorism217 and, as the Iranian squirt-gun fight episode demon-
strated, the same subjectivity may apply to cybercrime, generally.218 
Norming these standards and defining exactly what constitutes cyber-
crimes or acts of cyberterrorism—something eminently important to the 
enforcement of universal jurisdiction—will not be an easy task. There is 
strong probability that those definitions and norms would be generated 	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by the world’s more affluent countries, therefore reflecting a limited le-
gal perspective.219 This kind of political orientation in the actual prosecu-
tion of cybercrimes marks an additional concern about the practicality of 
simply extending jurisdiction beyond territorial borders. 
Procedural concerns constitute yet another set of challenges. Even pre-
suming that universal jurisdiction allows for one country to prosecute an 
identifiable defendant under a clear set of cybercrime statutes, current 
domestic court structures may not be equipped to handle the unique 
scope of such cases.220 A cybercriminal may attack a global network with 
a virus that can self-replicate and adapt to various computer systems and 
programs,221 making the nature and temporal extent of the harm difficult 
to specify with precision. In the event of such an attack, there may be 
millions of victims located just within the prosecuting nation’s bounda-
ries,222 not to mention the number of victims that could be affected 
worldwide on an ongoing basis. Such a vast and complicated case could 
overwhelm a nation’s judicial resources and few procedural mechanisms 
exist that could effectively control the scope and complexity of these le-
gal actions.223 
On balance, providing states with universal jurisdiction is impractical 
as a sole solution to combating cybercrime, though it is an approach that 
acknowledges many important realities. Gable successfully presents the 
importance of deterrence in preventing the attacks of would-be cyber-
criminals and correctly suggests that universal jurisdiction has a role to 
play in the larger efforts to combat cybercrime.224 
B. Domestic Adoption of International Statutes 
The creation of broad, multinational treaties—premised on traditional 
notions of territorial sovereignty—provides a less radical solution to 
dealing with cybercrime on an international level, though the very struc-
ture of such an approach threatens to limit its practicability.225 The Con-
vention on Cybercrime provides a model for this tactic and highlights the 	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important strengths and inherent weaknesses in relying on treaties to ad-
dress transnational cybercrime.226 
Multinational treaties can go far in making the initial strides of estab-
lishing norms and creating customary international law.227 Moreover, 
they can facilitate the domestic internalization of rules among participat-
ing states while still allowing each state to retain sovereignty.228 At the 
most fundamental level, such treaties (building primarily off of the Cy-
bercrime Convention and UN Security Council resolutions against terror-
ism and other grave criminal acts) can articulate the existence of state 
duties to prevent and respond to cybercrime.229 Without treaties to lead 
the way on these fronts, nations may struggle to identify the proper ave-
nues through which they can combat cybercrimes that touch so many 
different jurisdictions and actors.230 
Yet the value of treaties that rely on domestic legislation is limited to 
these first normative steps. As discussed in Part I.B, such treaties bind 
only member parties, who may still exert nonuniform efforts to com-
ply.231 For example, both Nation A and Nation B might criminalize the 
same cyberactivity in line with a cybercrime treaty to which they are 
both members, but they may vary in their approach to computer monitor-
ing measures.232 Alternatively, Nation A might move rapidly to enact 
universally agreed upon legal standards but will have the effectiveness of 
their efforts frustrated by a slower moving legislature in Nation B.233 In-
consistencies such as these will keep cooperation between member states 
problematic, particularly with regard to evidence sharing or extradition 
provisions.234 
Furthermore, a treaty that is too deferential to the sovereignty of par-
ticipating states is unlikely to resolve important jurisdictional dilem-
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mas.235 The Convention on Cybercrime, for example, is silent on the 
proper course of action when more than one country in the treaty has a 
valid jurisdictional claim over a particular act of cybercrime.236 
Ultimately, for such treaties to be successful they require universal par-
ticipation and binding provisions regarding the rules and procedures to 
which states should adhere in passing their own legislation.237 However, 
states would undoubtedly balk at such a powerful treaty and, even if they 
agreed to sign and ratify it, would undermine the treaty’s value through 
the insertion of numerous reservations that exempted them from the most 
stringent provisions.238 A multinational treaty, then, will play an impor-
tant role in mounting an initial international effort to fighting cybercrime, 
but it will fail if it relies entirely on domestic action for enforcement. 
C. Vesting Jurisdiction in an International Court 
The most promising method of preventing and prosecuting cybercrime 
marries the use of universal jurisdiction and multinational treaties, but 
goes the extra step of vesting jurisdiction over an international penal 
code on cybercrime in an international judicial body. By vesting jurisdic-
tion over cybercrime in a court modeled after the ICC, the international 
community can ensure that the authority of articulating definitions and 
standards will rest within single entity that can adapt in tandem with this 
ever-evolving field of crime. 
The Convention on Cybercrime, with its efforts to create a short list of 
universal definitions and its growing list of member parties, provides an 
important starting point in formulating an international penal code for 
cybercrime. In her article, “The Council of Europe’s Convention on Cy-
bercrime,” Amalie M. Weber articulates the values of establishing such a 
code: “It could be changed more easily as technology develops . . . states 
could better maintain consistency between their own legislative schemes 
and the model code [and, finally,] the process of developing such a mod-
el code might yield superior solutions to the jurisdictional problems per-
meating cybercrime legislation.”239 A detailed and specific penal code for 
cybercrime would also alleviate many of the definitional discrepancies 
that currently limit effective cooperation between various enforcement 
agencies and would help web users know more precisely what response 
their actions are likely to bring from regulators worldwide.240 	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An international penal code would require an extraterritorial regulatory 
power for enforcement and review.241 Because cyberspace exists without 
regard to territorial boundaries, universal jurisdiction proponents are cor-
rect to view the web as akin to the high seas. Unlike the high seas, 
though, this is a unique and dynamic realm that requires its own system 
of legal rules and regulatory processes that can evolve along with the 
space itself.242 The potential scope of harm in cyberspace, as mentioned 
earlier, far exceeds the amount of harm that a single pirate ship might 
cause on the seas.243 Thus, tasking individual nations with the duty to 
regulate cybercrime through universal jurisdiction may fail to address the 
potentially global implications of a single crime and the potentially com-
peting interests of different states in prosecuting that crime. Moreover, a 
single state, as discussed earlier, may be overwhelmed by the sheer vol-
ume of victims, the complexity of the issues, or other procedural hurdles 
unique to a major cybercrime.244 
The structure of the ICC serves as an ideal template for an international 
court or tribunal holding jurisdiction over cybercrime for at least four 
compelling reasons. First, the ICC’s potential to reach various criminal 
actors is already internationally (though admittedly not universally) sanc-
tioned. As long as either a cybercriminal or that criminal’s victims are 
citizens of a country that is party to the Rome Statute, the ICC may have 
jurisdiction over the matter.245 The international community’s landmark 
creation of the ICC, with its novel jurisdictional scope and structure, 
suggests that the creation of a similar court focused on cybercrime is not 
too far-fetched. 
Second, a complementarity provision and a focus on only the most se-
rious international crimes, again modeled on the ICC, will ensure that 
states may continue to exercise jurisdiction over less major cybercrimes 
or those that only affect domestic actors. An international cybercrime 
court would exercise jurisdiction over only those cases that affect global 
classes of victims (those with populations that are enormous, dispersed 
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across multiple nations, or both), truly heinous crimes or terrorist acts, or 
even impermissible cyberattacks between states. 
Third, an international cybercrime court, much like the Supreme Court 
in the United States, would have the ability to provide authoritative and 
final interpretations over the international penal code and thus could 
quickly adapt the law when necessitated by technological advancements. 
Should a cybercriminal utilize a new technology to perpetrate a harmful 
act in an as-yet inconceivable manner, the court would play the critical 
role of interpreting the international cyber penal laws to evaluate whether 
the criminal’s actions fall within the international community’s defini-
tions of illegal conduct. Moreover, the international can be structured to 
be more liberal with regard to the procedural and privacy rights of defen-
dants than many national court systems,246 again increasing the likeli-
hood of state participation in an international cybercrime court. 
Finally, the rulings of such a court would benefit from the preexisting 
multinational cybercrime task forces, which will be able to act as the 
court’s otherwise-lacking enforcement mechanism. 
The proposal’s benefits reveal themselves when considered against a 
hypothetical situation in which, for example, a cybercriminal, in viola-
tion of one of the international cyber penal laws, launches a malicious 
Trojan Horse through individuals’ Facebook accounts. If the cybercrimi-
nal was an American, and substantially all of the victims were also 
Americans, then American courts would exercise jurisdiction over the 
case. However, in the more likely case that the class of victims contained 
individuals—including corporations and other organizational groups—
from various countries, the international court would exercise jurisdic-
tion over the matter. Multinational law enforcement teams would coordi-
nate the investigation into the precise extent and nature of the harm and 
would locate, arrest, and detain the criminal. A scenario in which one 
country accuses another of cyberespionage or a coordinated cyberattack 
provides a second helpful hypothetical. Before the states escalate to 
armed conflict, the international court would have the opportunity to rule 
on whether the actions of the accused nation constituted a violation of the 
international penal laws and then propose a solution. 
Of course, vesting jurisdiction over cybercrime in an international cy-
bercrime court or tribunal would still present a host of challenges. The 
creation of such a court would surely mirror and perhaps surpass the cur-
rent hurdles the ICC faces in terms of speed, relevance, and authority 	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mentioned in Part I.D above. Beyond these initial challenges, implement-
ing this Note’s proposal would face at least three specific obstacles. First, 
states will be hesitant to sacrifice sovereignty to an international body. 
Some optimists may argue that placing the power to regulate cybercrime 
in an international court would not necessarily be an extreme act because 
the regulatory participation of non-state and multi-state entities, in addi-
tion to transnational common law-making, may already be blurring the 
traditional boundaries of jurisdiction.247 However, giving an international 
cybercrime court complete regulatory power would be a truly unprece-
dented shift in international law and will be a hard pill for many sover-
eign states to swallow. Second, significant efforts would be required to 
draft both an international penal code and an international treaty creating 
an international court or tribunal with specific power of review over cy-
bercrimes. As discussed above, the lack of uniformity in cybercrime 
definitions and the sluggish nature of treaty-making guarantee that pro-
ducing such documents will be exceptionally difficult. Finally, the new 
international court will be reliant on independent states to provide en-
forcement and funding, requiring a mechanism to ensure cooperation 
between states.248 Though state enforcement agencies are increasingly 
working together via multinational taskforces to combat cybercrime, 
binding them to such efforts may, again, run counter to states’ traditional 
notions of sovereignty. 
Still, there is ample support for the belief that a specialized cybercrime 
court could serve as the most effective answer to cybercrime. The United 
States may have already blazed the trail in recent years by creating fed-
eral courts with specialized jurisdiction, most notably the United State 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which holds exclusive appellate 
review over almost all patent cases in country.249 Congress created the 
Federal Circuit and granted it review over the nation’s patent appeals in 
large part to harmonize the widely divergent approaches to patent law 
that had evolved in different regions of the United States.250 By allowing 
a court to specialize in one area of the law, particularly one that is based 
on complex and predominantly nonlegal underlying concepts, its judges 	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can develop an expertise that will be more likely to result in consistent 
and practical rulings.251 The success of the Federal Circuit in promulgat-
ing a consistent judicial gloss for patent law is likely to be repeated by a 
cybercrime court. The probable emergence, and then prominence, of 
“technocratic” judges252 on a cybercrime court may also alleviate con-
cerns about the courts’ inherent biases toward one kind of legal system or 
set of policies,253 reduce the chances that judges with no technical savvy 
will permit overly intrusive search and seizure practices, and perhaps 
even position it to hear civil cases254 in addition to criminal. 
The ever-evolving and growing threat of cybercrime may serve as a 
catalyst that pushes the international community to break away from its 
traditional hesitancy to sacrifice state sovereignty to international organi-
zations. Conceivably, a truly global cyberattack of unprecedented, but 
plausibly catastrophic, proportions could usher in a rapid global response 
that could result in an international cybercrime court gaining jurisdiction 
over an international cyber penal code. States should act responsibly to 
take decisive action on this issue before such a cyberattack occurs. 
CONCLUSION 
Cybercrime is a new and rapidly evolving form of crime that is 
uniquely suited to international regulation and multinational enforce-
ment. Though universal jurisdiction and treaty-based approaches may be 
effective in combating cybercriminals to a certain extent, such efforts 	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will be most effective in the context of establishing an international cy-
bercrime penal code and vesting jurisdiction over that body of law in an 
international cybercrime court. While this solution admittedly faces 
daunting challenges, the preexisting and growing presence of multina-
tional taskforces lends an enforcement mechanism that has heretofore 
been absent in most international courts—an exception to the norm that 
makes placing authority in a new international court at once more feasi-
ble and, therefore, potentially objectionable to sovereign states. Anything 
short of this level of action, however, will continue to leave the world in 
an ever-more precarious position in which cybercriminals threaten to 
harm individuals, cripple global economies, and disable entire nations. 
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